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Abstract  
Dutch disease is a condition whereby a booming export sector along with a concomitant strengthening of 
the non-tradable sector cause a deterioration in the rest of the tradable sector. Regression analysis finds 
that Dutch disease due to international remittances appears to afflict the developing countries more than 
the upper income countries. Developing countries, however, can inoculate their economies with policies 
that strengthen the domestic economy and facilitate structural change to keep the disease from setting in. 
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1. Introduction  
 
International remittances have steadily increased to reach levels that cannot remain unnoticed. Data from 
the World Bank indeed show that total international remittances reached US$131 billion in 2000 from 
US$2 billion in 1970. The figure in 2011 is expected to exceed US$460 billion despite a drawn out global 
economic crisis. Data also indicate that, in recent periods, the developing countries take more than 70% of 
the total amount to exceed the combined receipts of direct foreign investments and foreign aid.  
 
The new status of international remittances in the economy has stimulated research. Studies find that, at 
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least at the personal or household level, international remittances make increases in consumption and 
welfare possible even within the poor societies. At the macroeconomy level, international remittances 
allow increases in disposable incomes and help fuel economic expansion and, in some cases, buoy the 
economy away from balance of payments problems. But one issue remains controversial: Do international 
remittances cause Dutch disease? The extant literature indicates an affirmative answer (c.f., Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo, 2004; Bourdet and Falck, 2006; Lartney et al., 2008; Bayangos and Jensen 2011). 
This paper takes the same view, but it also argues that Dutch disease can be preempted from setting in, if 
not reversed once it is detected, with the judicious use of policies to support the expansion of production 
and strengthening of external competitiveness.  
 
Following the introduction, Part 2 describes the Dutch disease, the variant of Dutch disease in the context 
of international remittances and the regression model. Part 3 discusses the results. The last part concludes. 
 
2. Diagnosing Dutch disease 
 
Consider first an economy comprised of two sectors: trading sector and non-trading sector. The trading 
sector produces to export, but the non-trading sector produces for domestic consumption. Corden (1984) 
and Corden and Neary (1982) split the trading sector into a booming export sector and the rest of the 
export sector. 
 
Next, suppose there are surges in capital inflows because of a boom in the export sector. Shifts in 
commodities spending in favor of the non-trading sector and movements of resources away from the rest 
of the export sector in favor of the non-trading sector occur. Even if the capital inflows take various forms, 
the result is the same: the rest of the export sector is ruined as the non-trading sector flourishes. 
 
The model posits that the shifts in spending and resources are mediated by appreciations in the real 
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exchange rate. With regards to the spending effect, increased incomes following a boom in the export 
sector increase the demand for both tradable and non-tradable commodities. Such an increase in demand 
exerts pressure on the prices of non-tradable commodities, which induces an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate that adversely affects the rest of the export sector as commodities become less competitive 
in the international market. Stability is achieved with resources shifting away from the rest of the export 
sector in favor of the non-trading sector. 
 
The process is straightforward in terms of the resource movement effects. The expansion in the booming 
export sector increases the demand for its factor inputs, which siphons factor inputs from both the rest of 
the export sector and the non-trading sector. Subsequently, the decrease in the supply of non-tradable 
commodities increases the price of those commodities and encourages economic production. The 
responses thus draw resources away from the rest of the export sector. Ultimately, the deployment of 
resources in the rest of the export sector declines as resources are shifted toward the non-trading sector. 
 
The basic Dutch disease model described above applies to the case of international remittances, too. What 
needs to be stressed, however, is that the booming sector represented by the deployment of workers 
abroad is not anything like the traditional booming sector of exported goods and services because workers 
are not exactly produced like the conventional commodities (c.f., Sweezy 1949). If so, prices and real 
exchange rates really do not have an effect on the deployment of workers abroad in the same way that 
they affect the export of goods and services. Still, international remittances affect macroeconomy and 
structural change in the country.  
 
The model in this paper begins with the standard two sectors setup. Here, the tradable sector (TT) is the 
total value of exported goods and services, while the non-tradable sector (NT) is the total of consumption 
expenditures plus gross capital formation but net of the total of exported and imported goods and services. 
Together, they represent total production of an economy at time t as measured by the gross domestic 
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product (GDP). Adding up the relative shares to GDP means  
  STT + SNT = 1,         (1) 
where SST is the share of the tradable sector to GDP and SNT is the share of non-tradable sector to GDP. 
Taking the logarithm of Equation 1, obtains 
  log(STT + SNT) = 0,         (2) 
which means that the shares of the two sectors are inversely related to each other but they can still grow at 
positive rates.  
 
For the regression analysis, a reduced model is specified as 
 log(TTi) = αi + β REM + γi X + θi Z + ei,       (3) 
where REM is international remittances; X is a vector of macroeconomy indicators, and Z is a vector of 
structural change indicators. The claim of the paper is that β < 0 confirms Dutch disease. The variables 
used in the regressions are described in turn.1 
 
Macroeconomy Policies, X 
 
Indicators are used to represent four dimensions of macroeconomy policy: fiscal, monetary, exchange 
rate, and trade. Fiscal policy is the share of public sector spending to GDP to a proxy for government 
participation in the economy. Obviously, well designed government spending supports economic 
expansion. It goes without saying that uncontrolled spending is detrimental to long-term economic 
sustainability. But if spending is restricted because of fiscal consolidation and other related contractionary 
measures, government participation is diluted to make fiscal policy ineffective against Dutch disease. The 
claim of the paper is that fiscal policy can have a positive or negative effect on the tradable sector. 
 
The proxy for monetary policy is inflation. Monetary policy has to complement fiscal policy and it needs 
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to respond to demand expansions in order to quell unnecessary inflationary pressures. Evidently, loose 
monetary policy is not helpful for long-term economic expansion. Still, (quasi) inflation targeting limits 
the efficacy of fiscal policy. And so raising interest rates to control economic expansion, aggressive 
sterilization of funds to manage inflation, and other measures can turn out to be anti-growth and result in 
some unutilized or underutilized resources that discourage domestic investments for economic production. 
Restrictive monetary policy may turn out to be the problem rather than the Dutch disease. Like fiscal 
policy, the claim here is that monetary policy can have a positive or negative effect on the tradable sector. 
 
Exchange rate policy is represented by the share of international reserves to GDP. Often, currency 
management aimed at avoiding drastic currency appreciation manifests in the form of large increases in 
international reserves. Like restrictive monetary policy, excessive reserves accumulation can turn out to 
be anti-growth. In light of the recent spate of capital crises, governments have assumed a defensive stance 
to build up enough reserves in preparation for potential speculative attacks on their respective economies. 
In addition, many governments have become hesitant in using capital inflows to carry out real resource 
transfers because of inflation phobia. As a consequence, the macroeconomy setting becomes susceptible 
to Dutch disease. As with the earlier indicators, exchange rate policy can have positive or negative effect 
on the tradable sector. 
 
Trade policy is represented by the share of total imports of goods and services to GDP. It is a proxy for 
trade openness. In the context of the macroeconomy, importation is one way to ease relative scarcities that 
constrain production and domestic consumption.2 Importation can facilitate technological diffusion and 
adaptation, too (Lucas, 2009). As such, the complementarities between importation and the tradable 
sector help reverse the Dutch disease. The claim of the paper is that trade policy has a positive effect on 
the tradable sector. 
                                                 
2 Imports can satisfy the demand for commodities in the short run, but domestic production needs to expand in the 
medium or long run. Prices of tradable commodities are determined by the international market. 
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Structural Change, Z 
 
There are three measures of structural change: labor, industrial, and financial capacities. Labor capacity is 
the inverse of labor productivity, namely: the ratio of the labor force to GDP. First, increasing labor 
productivity is expected to release labor from economic production. But limited development or economic 
stagnation translates into low labor demand and that, too, releases labor from economic production. Either 
process does not imply that Dutch disease is in play. How well labor is reallocated to enhance sectoral 
production indicates the strength of sectoral capacity. The claim of the paper is that labor capacity has a 
positive effect on the tradable sector. 
 
Industrial capacity means the depth of the production sectors. Its proxy is the share of total value added of 
agriculture and industry to GDP. Structural transformation means that development is generating 
reallocations of resources across sectors. Such changes do not mean Dutch disease is in play because they 
emerge along with the changes in the structure of production. Thus the claim of the paper is that structural 
transformation has a positive effect on the tradable sector.  
 
The proxy for financial capacity is the share of total credit to GDP. It basically represents financial 
intermediation by the monetary authorities and banking sector as a whole. Financial intermediation brings 
about effective allocation of internal and/or external funds in support of sectoral production. Accordingly, 
greater financial depth brings about greater financial intermediation and fuels economic expansion. The 
claim of the paper is that financial capacity has a positive effect on the tradable sector. 
 
 Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
The top 20 international remittance-recipient countries listed the Migration and Remittances Factbook 
comprises the sample of the paper. The raw data are from the World Development Indicators online. 
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Complete information is required to compile a dataset spanning the period 1984 to 2008. The countries 
are grouped into three according to income categories to control for the differences in their levels of 
development and standards of living. Separate regressions are performed for each income group.  
 
3. Who gets Dutch disease? 
 
The primary diagnosis is: Dutch disease caused by international remittances is more of a developing 
country problem than an upper income country problem (Table 1). Moreover, the results indicate that low 
income countries suffer more than the middle income countries because the production structures in the 
former are relatively weaker. Low countries are thus easily hit by this strain of the disease. The diagnosis 
actually supports the oft repeated mantra that industrialization is vital to avoid an economic decline. In 
addition, the results indicate that upper income countries do not suffer from Dutch disease caused by 
international remittances presumably because their case is more of a function of the level of development. 
In other words, the declines in their tradable sectors are caused by economic maturation that gives rise to 
de-industrialization.3 
 
Table 1: Summary of results, in percent (%) 
 Upper income Middle income Low income 
Remittance  -3.66 -12.01 
Remittance, lagged   -4.85 
    
Monetary policy 6.30 0.03  
Exchange rate policy -5.52 -1.71 -1.39 
Trade policy 5.24 2.59 5.76 
    
Labor capacity -1.37   
Industrial capacity 1.43 -0.78 -4.34 
Financial capacity -1.32  1.86 
Note: The reported indicators are statistically significant at 5%, except for lagged remittance of 
low income countries that is significant at 10%. See Appendix for details of the results. 
 
The secondary diagnoses deal with the macroeconomy and structural change indicators. The total impact 
                                                 
3 See Palma (2005) for a similar view. 
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of the macroeconomic indicators is enough to at least ameliorate the impact of the Dutch disease (Table 
1). Results for all income groups show that fiscal policy is statistically insignificant in affected the 
tradable sector. But the other macroeconomy policy indicators can be useful tools. Perhaps the problem 
with fiscal policy is choosing the appropriate indicator. Other proxies like budget deficit or tax revenues 
also do not give useful results. To some extent, these results for the developing countries are expected 
because the public sectors there are typically not as strong as the public sectors in upper income countries. 
In any case, the findings are still useful because they may be interpreted to suggest that the private sector 
needs to play a bigger role in the economy. If so, there is a role for public-private sectors partnerships in 
the economy. 
 
Monetary policy indicators of the developing countries turn out to be not statistically significant. In the 
upper income countries, where (quasi) inflation targeting is in place, the results indicate that restrictive 
monetary policy facilitates the shifts in production away from the tradable sector. Interestingly, this 
finding confirms the disutility of (quasi) inflation targeting in the upper income countries. What this 
finding also indicates is that relaxing monetary policy to allow for more inflation might be helpful to the 
tradable sector.  
 
Currency appreciation undermines the tradable sector in both the developing and upper income countries. 
This finding means that having an appropriate international reserves management policy is of critical 
importance to a vigorous industrialization and technological upgrading program. Put another way, 
exchange rate policy is an essential tool for development.  
 
Importation can potentially help prevent or even reverse Dutch disease. In both the developing and upper 
income countries, the results indicate that importation complement and/or support the tradable sector. 
These findings invalidate the concerns about importation hurting domestic production. Actually, such 
concerns if valid are most problematic in the low income countries where the production structures are 
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not yet well developed. Middle income countries can face such problems if importation competes with 
home-grown industrialization. However, it is interesting to find that the coefficient on importation in the 
low income countries turn out to be as large as that of the upper income countries. Perhaps catching up on 
the economic ladder is not implausible. 
 
The structural change indicators present more interesting results. For instance, improvements in labor 
capacity are needed in the upper income countries to maintain their positions in the international market. 
Not much can be said for the developing countries, although conceptually raising labor capacity is needed 
to launch industrialization there. Labor released from sectoral production then creates a pool of workers 
that dampens wage increases or, at least, guarantees sufficient labor supply to sustain industrial 
deepening. Thus the important issue is not about how labor is mobilized but the manner in which labor 
gets absorbed into the production sectors. 
 
Shifts in the configuration of economic production occur as there are shifts in the key production sectors. 
The developing countries appear to conform to this mode. The shifts in production sectors allow the 
developing countries to move from the interior of their production possibilities to the frontier. Of course, 
this process needs to accelerate with productivity increases. As the developing countries move to the 
frontier, more production happens and induces further reallocation of resources to improve the quality of 
production. For the upper income countries, on the other hand, results suggest that there is a need for 
rapid discovery and innovations. Put simply, being on the production possibilities demands extending, 
rather than regressing, the frontier.  
 
The results indicate that greater financial capacity empowers the tradable sector. As production in the 
developing countries expands and industrialization begins to set in, the resulting greater demand for 
financial intermediation strengthens any complementarity between the financial and tradable sectors. In 
the process, industrial deepening is hastened. For the upper income countries, results show the reverse 
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trend. Perhaps this finding points to how financialization in the upper income countries has already 
transformed financial intermediation from a mechanism that supports economic production in general to 
an instrument for assets accumulation in particular.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
The paper examines Dutch disease in the context of international remittances. The main diagnosis is that 
developing countries are susceptible to that strain of the disease but the upper income countries are not. 
For the upper income countries, Dutch disease, if it hits them, is associated with economic maturation.  
 
The secondary diagnoses point out that both the macroeconomy and structural change indicators can be 
preventive measures against or remedies for the disease. For developing countries, competitive exchange 
rates and trade openness can be strong stimuli to their tradable sector. Improvements in labor and 
industrial capacities and financial deepening can also strengthen industrialization and facilitate 
technological upgrading. Indeed, the total impact of the macroeconomic indicators is enough to at least 
ameliorate the impact of the disease. 
 
Dutch disease caused by international remittance is a preventable and curable ailment. To the extent that 
the macroeconomy settings help shape the character of economic production, progress can thus be made 
more deliberate. And to the extent that structural changes affect economic production, industrialization 
can thus be taken up more strategically. In view of the findings, the developing countries can get 
inoculated from getting the disease if they exercise vigilance and ensure the stability of economic 
production using appropriate policies. If they get infected they must act with due haste to prevent the 
disease from crippling their tradable sectors. Simply put, those who are able to manage the changes 
brought about by international remittances are also able to move up the industrialization ladder, whereas 
those that fail could get stuck in low-level development or, worse, fall down from the economic ladder.  
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